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ABSTRACT
Livestreaming platforms have become increasingly popular in recent
years as a means of sharing and advertising creative content. Popular
content streamers who attract large viewership to their live broadcasts
can earn a living by means of ad revenue, donations and channel sub-
scriptions. Unfortunately, this incentivized popularity has simultane-
ously resulted in incentive for fraudsters to provide services to astroturf,
or artificially inflate viewership metrics by providing fake “live” views
to customers. Our work provides a number of major contributions: (a)
formulation: we are the first to introduce and characterize the viewbot
fraud problem in livestreaming platforms, (b) methodology: we propose
FLOCK, a principled and unsupervised method which efficiently and ef-
fectively identifies botted broadcasts and their constituent botted views,
and (c) practicality: our approach achieves over 98% precision in identi-
fying botted broadcasts and over 90% precision/recall against sizable
synthetically generated viewbot attacks on a real-world livestreaming
workload of over 16 million views and 92 thousand broadcasts. FLOCK
successfully operates on larger datasets in practice and is regularly used
at a large, undisclosed livestreaming corporation.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Intrusion/anomaly detection and mal-
ware mitigation;•Information systems→Web mining;
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, livestreaming platforms have risen to provide an
unprecedented level of accessible and open video content to internet
users. Livestreaming services such as Twitch, Youtube Live, and Us-
tream enable broadcasters to stream live video content of various types
(often including electronic sports gameplay and other creative content)
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to an interested viewerbase who can both watch and interact with the
broadcasters from their personal devices.
Given that livestreaming has become a popular social platform for
many online communities, it has simultaneously become a target for
fraud by means of astroturfing, or artificially inflating viewership and
internet popularity. As viewership is a popular target metric for recom-
mendation and a proxy for content quality, gaming this metric offers
broadcasters numerous perceived benefits including improved recom-
mendation rankings, directory listings, monetary partnership incentives,
and hopes of a resultingly larger authentic future audience. As such, it
simultaneously hinders the experience for viewers who are suggested
synthetically boosted content, as well as honest broadcasters who are
overlooked in favor of dishonest ones. Numerous websites such as
viewbot.net and streambot.com offer competitively priced
viewbots which can be activated and deactivated on-demand to many
customers who wish to artifically inflate their “live” viewership.
For these very reasons, it is important for livestreaming service
providers to tackle the major issue of discerning inauthentic from au-
thentic views. This is exactly the problem we focus on in this work.
While the astroturfing problem in the traditional social network (follow-
ership) setting has been explored in prior literature as an unsupervised
dense-subgraph mining [23, 3, 18] or supervised classification [28, 7]
problem, the livestreaming (viewership) setting manifests numerous
new challenges. Firstly, the impermanence of viewbots with primar-
ily customer-controlled (rather than operator-controlled) parameters
makes traditional dense-subgraph mining methods unsuitable – individ-
ual customers control how many viewbots they want to use at a given
time as well as when they should start and stop, so attacks will gener-
ally not involve the same bots viewing the same channels at the same
times. Secondly, the lack of sufficient ground-truth labels and indicative
view-based features makes the classification task challenging. These
differences contribute towards making the livestreaming astroturfing
problem a distinct challenge from traditional settings.
In this work, to the best of our knowledge, we give the first known
characterization, formulation and proposed solution to the livestream
astroturfing problem. We begin by describing prior work on both
livestreaming and astroturfing frontiers. We next describe the livest-
reaming astroturfing problem context and goals for practitioners look-
ing to identify fraudulent behavior on livestreaming platforms both
informally and formally. We further build intuition for, and propose
FLOCK, an unsupervised, multi-step process for identifying viewbots in
livestreaming settings which circumvents the aforementioned challenges.
Our FLOCK approach works by (a) modeling broadcasts as aggregates
of viewing behavior, (b) identifying anomalous (botted) broadcasts, and
(c) identifying anomalous (botted) views from within these broadcasts
(see Figure 1). We next evaluate FLOCK on a large-scale, industrial
livestreaming workload and show experimental results demonstrating
strong performance in practice as well as robustness against synthetic,
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(a) Viewbotting software (b) Viewcount-deviance plot (c) Broadcast-behavior plot
Figure 1: FLOCK finds botted broadcasts and their botted views. Figure 1a shows one of many user-controlled viewbotting tools used to astroturf
broadcast viewcount from bot-provider IPs. Figure 1b shows FLOCK’s viewcount-deviance plot which plots each broadcast in the dataset by its
viewcount and deviance from our model – notice the red decision boundary separating anomalous, high-deviance broadcasts from the high density (teal)
region of broadcasts. Figure 1c shows a broadcast behavior plot for one such botted broadcast, where each point is a view’s start and duration fraction
through the broadcast – notice the highly synchronized viewbot (colored) behavior where almost all views persist throughout the broadcast duration.
adversarial attacks. Lastly, we discuss means for leveraging the results
from FLOCK in practice and conclude. Summarily, our contributions are:
1. Problem formulation: We describe and formalize the problem
of viewbot detection in livestreaming settings.
2. Algorithm:We propose the FLOCK algorithm, and unsupervised
and scalable approach for finding viewbots in practice.
3. Practical efficacy: We demonstrate that FLOCK achieves high
precision/recall in practice and is robust and scalable.
2. RELATED WORK
As the astroturfing problem on livestreaming platforms has not pre-
viously been studied, we loosely categorize prior work into two main
categories: livestreaming and astroturfing in social media.
Livestreaming: [26] empirically analyzes a livestreaming workload
taken from internet-accessible cameras in Brazil, and models client
arrivals as a Poisson process and interest profiles as a Zipf distribution
for use in a synthetic workload generation toolkit. [25] conducts a
larger-scale workload analysis using data from Akamai (a major content
delivery network) and additionally presents results on client diversity,
lifetime and stream popularity. [27] studies performance of peer-to-
peer (P2P) livestreaming systems using various queueing models. [16]
presents the design of a scalable P2P livestreaming service built using
inter-overlay optimization. [17, 9] discuss performance metrics and
bounds for measuring network-quality in P2P livestreaming settings.
[15] describes the prevalence of livestreaming of electronic sports (video
games) and presents models to predict stream performance and popular-
ity. [8] studies the buildup and breakdown of individual and community
behaviors on Twitch streams of varying popularity.
Astroturfing in social media: [4, 29] propose random-walk based
methods which aim to leverage abnormally sparse cuts between sybil
and honest regions of undirected social networks to identify sybil nodes.
[21, 23, 13, 12] leverage spectral decompositions (eigendecomposi-
tion and SVD) to catch users in social networks including Twitter and
Weibo who form dense subgraphs or project abnormally to low-rank
subspaces. [3, 5] detail local clustering methods on Facebook page-likes
and other user actions which aim to catch synchronized behavior in
the form of temporally-coherent bipartite cores in graphs. [1] finds
anomalies in weighted graphs by demonstrating power-law patterns
in features of graph egonets. [24, 11] detail information theoretic and
Bayesian approaches of identifying anomalous nodes and spammers
in edge-attributed networks. [19] finds fraudulent sellers and reviewers
on eBay using belief propagation when few node labels are known. [7]
uses a multinomial naive-bayes classifier on n-grams of account names
and e-mail addresses to find spammers on LinkedIn.
3. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Livestreaming platforms connect streamers, or content broadcasters,
with an audience of viewers. Each streamer broadcasts live video on
their personal channel at various times for various durations, where
one continuous stream is called a broadcast. Broadcasts are generally
associated with video games, music, television, podcasts and other
creative works. Viewers can enjoy live broadcasts by navigating to
the streamer’s channel during the times which he or she is live, and
subsequently watching the broadcast.
While streaming content is just a hobby for most streamers, livest-
reaming platforms typically offer partner status exclusively to those
who consistently stream and attain a large viewership. Partnership
typically offers streamers numerous benefits including the ability to
monetize from ad-revenue and paid viewer subscriptions for bonus
channel content. Streamers are thus incentivized to inflate their live
viewership statistics by using viewbots to both satisfy requirements for
gaining partnership status and making money, as well as to improve
their rankings in livestreaming directories which viewers can browse to
find popular content. Sufficiently successful streamers can make living
wages just from streaming as a full-time job – very popular streamers
can make hundreds of thousands of dollars or more per year by means
of subscriptions, donations and ad-revenue alone [14].
As views must be “live” when streamers are broadcasting, viewbot
providers offer streamers full control with regards to (a) howmany view-
bots they would like to use (i.e choosing 47 from 0-100), and (b) how
long the viewbots should continue to watch the stream. Upon streamer
command, IPs under control of the viewbot provider emulate real view-
ers by sendingHTTP requests for video to the livestreaming service until
they are signaled to stop. Currently, a rate limit (only allowed k concur-
rent views per IP) is in place, meaning viewbot providers need access to
n
k
IPs to successfully imitate n viewers. Given the size of the IP space
from which inauthentic views can come from and transient, anonymous
and streamer-controlled nature of viewbots, traditional unsupervised
approaches to the astroturfing problem such as dense-subgraph detec-
tion and tensor decomposition are not suitable. Furthermore, given that
ground-truth labels are difficult to obtain and most features gleanable
from HTTP requests can be spoofed, supervised models for labeling
individual views require constant monitoring due to their short-lived use.
Livestreaming industry practitioners are thus faced with the difficult
problem of distinguishing authentic human viewers from inauthentic
viewbots. Addressing this problem offers numerous benefits, most
notably in preventing streamers who aim to cheat the system from
becoming partnered, as well as limiting the inflation of perceived view-
ership and improving the authenticity of recommended popular content.
4. PROPOSED METHOD: FLOCK
We first give the intuition behind our FLOCK approach, and subse-
quently describe the individual steps in greater detail.
4.1 Intuition and Problem Formulation
As previously mentioned, labeling individual views as authentic or
inauthentic from information contained in HTTP requests is difficult
and adversarially error-prone. The intuition behind FLOCK is to take
an unsupervised, offline approach which enables us to focus on viewing
behaviors in aggregate and identify behaviors that stand out from some
model of normal aggregate behavior. Specifically, we start by building
a model of normal broadcast behavior, where broadcasts are considered
aggregates of views. Next, we focus on a broadcast-level analysis instead
of a view-level analysis, wherewe examine the aggregate behavior for all
viewers who watch a given broadcast and determine whether or not the
overall broadcast looks suspicious – that is, we formulate the problem of
identifying botted broadcasts as an outlier detection problem. Broadcast-
level analysis is useful, as it can account for multiple views simultane-
ously: while a single view which starts at 1pm and ends at 3pm on a
given broadcast is not particularly suspicious, hundreds of such views
are more suggestive of bot activity. We build from this intuition and re-
strict our analysis to this set of botted broadcasts and try to find groups of
similar views that behave like bots by starting and stopping in lockstep.
If removing such a group makes the broadcast look less suspicious in
accordance with our model, then we classify those views as inauthentic.
This hierarchical paradigm of broadcast-level and subsequent view-
level analysis offers interpretability and straightforward applications to
both examining streamer broadcast history for viewbotting when they
apply for partnership, as well as identifying IPs commonly used for
viewbot traffic. Formally, we define our problem as follows:
PROBLEM 1 (VIEWBOT IDENTIFICATION). Given the set of views
V and corresponding functions α(v), ω(v), and χ(v) for all v ∈ V,
which represent view start time, end time, and broadcast, and the set
of broadcasts B and corresponding functions α(b),ω(b), and ρ(b) for
all b∈B, which represent broadcast start time, end time, and the set of
views {v1...vk}⊆V, find the suspicious set of broadcasts
Bbotted⊆B
and suspicious set of views
Vbotted⊆
⋃
b∈Bbotted
ρ(b)
This can be broken down into several steps, each with their own sub-
problem, which we describe the methodology for below: (a) modeling
broadcast behavior, (b) identifying botted broadcasts and (c) identifying
botted views. For clarity, please see Table 1 for reference of the recurrent
symbols we use in the remainder of the section.
4.2 Modeling Broadcast Behavior
As a means towards the goal of identifying suspicious from normal
broadcasts, we must first build towards a model for what normal broad-
cast behavior looks like. Given the lack of ground-truth labeled data, we
Symbol Definition
V,Vbotted set of views and botted views, resp.
B,Bbotted set of broadcasts and botted broadcasts, resp.
α(v),α(b) view v and broadcast b’s start time, resp.
ω(v),ω(b) view v and broadcast b’s end time, resp.
χ(v) broadcast which view v watched
ρ(b) views that watched broadcast b
β(b) bracket which broadcast b belongs to
ζ(t) set of broadcasts in bracket t
bˆ probability distribution for broadcast b
tˆ model probability distribution for bracket t
vstart,vstay start and stay feature representations for view v
1X,Y (v) indicator noting if v is in bin (X,Y )
H discretization parameter for broadcast duration
T discretization parameter for bracket duration
K IQR multiplier for broadcast decision boundary
DKL(pˆ‖ qˆ) KL divergence of qˆ from pˆ
I set of lockstep instances for a given broadcast b
Table 1: Frequently used symbols and definitions.
Figure 2: Most broadcasts deviate from brackets predictably
lowly, but outliers deviate abnormally highly. The plot shows each
broadcast as a point with viewcount on the x-axis and deviance between
broadcast/bracket on the y-axis (area density denoted by color). The
red line indicates our decision boundary.
focus on an unsupervised model. To build such a model, we must first
identify a set of relevant features. In this work, we avoid using descrip-
tive (browser, country of origin, etc.) and engagement-based (chat activ-
ity, means of website navigation, etc.) features due to ease of manipula-
bility and susceptibility to adversarial camouflage (engaging in actions
that authentic viewers might do to appear human). Instead, we focus on
modeling broadcasts by the temporal features of their constituent views.
Specifically, for each view v in broadcast χ(v), we are interested in
v’s start and end times, α(v) and ω(v) respectively. Using view start
time and duration is appealing, as these aspects of a view are difficult
to spoof given the so-called “mission-constraints” of viewbot providers.
Viewbots must necessarily persist for a streamer-desired duration by
their very purpose – to boost the live concurrent viewers for an extended
period of time.
Since a view must start during, and cannot persist longer than its
corresponding broadcast χ(v) respectively, it is intuitive to consider
these features as fractional values rather than raw timestamps. This is
accomplished by defining the view start time and duration (“stay” time)
features (vstart and vstay respectively) as
vstart=
α(v)−α(χ(v))
ω(χ(v))−α(χ(v)) ,vstay=
ω(v)−α(v)
ω(χ(v))−α(χ(v))
For example, if a view begins halfway through a broadcast and
lasts until three-quarters of the way through, it has a vstart=0.5 and
vstay=0.25. Note that this enforces the invariant vstart+vstay≤1.
Given that each broadcast b has an associated set of constituent views
ρ(b), we choose to model each b as a random variable drawn from
a joint probability distribution reflecting the frequency of empirically
observed views. To simplify representation and alleviate sparsity issues
for broadcasts with small numbers of views, we discretize the otherwise
continuous vstart and vstay space over some number of H intervals
each – H is tuned empirically. Thus, vstart and vstay can each take
on values from {1...H}, so the post-discretization sample space has a
total of H(H+1)
2
outcomes (keeping in mind the invariant) – we will
henceforth refer to vstart and vstay as features defined on {1...H}.
Specifically, we model each bwith a multinomial probability distribu-
tion bˆ with probability masses for the outcomes defined by maximum-
likelihood estimate (MLE) parameters. In this case, each view is treated
as a realization of the associated random variable. Formally, we have
bˆ(vstart=X,vstay=Y )=
∑
v∈ρ(b)
1X,Y (v)
|ρ(b)|
whereX,Y ∈{1...H} and 1X,Y (v) is the indicator function which
returns 1 if v belongs in bin (X,Y ) and 0 otherwise. While we do
not formally define the indicator here in interest of space, it follows
naturally as a function of α(v), ω(v) and ω(b)−α(b).
Given this approach for modeling behavior of a single broadcast, we
now aim to build a model for what normal broadcast behavior looks like.
In doing so, we build these models of normal behavior for broadcasts
with different lengths separately, since viewers of different-length broad-
casts are expected to behave differently. For example, views defined
with vstart=0 and vend=1 (indicating a full broadcast duration view)
are likely far more common for broadcasts lasting 10 minutes than they
are for broadcasts lasting 10 hours. This is due to a number of factors
including time-constraints for the viewer, viewer endurance, etc. In
order to group together similar-lengthed broadcasts which we expect to
be composed of similar patterns of viewer behavior, we discretize the
the broadcast durations observed in our dataset into intervals spanning T
minutes to alleviate sparsity issues – T is tuned empirically. We refer to
these intervals as broadcast brackets, and introduce the functions β(b) to
denote b’s bracket, and ζ(t) to denote the set of broadcasts in bracket t.
Summarily, brackets are an abstraction which serve to help us separately
consider and model the behaviors of different-lengthed broadcasts.
To model the behavior for each broadcast bracket, we take a similar
approach as for individual broadcasts: we model the bracket as a joint
multinomial distribution, again using MLE parameters from the em-
pirically observed views over all constituent broadcasts in the bracket.
Formally, to compute the model distribution tˆ for bracket t, we have
tˆ(vstart=X,vstay=Y )=
∑
b∈ζ(t)
 ∑
v∈ρ(b)
1XY (v)∑
b∈ζ(t)
|ρ(b)|

Note that the usefulness of such a model in capturing normal broad-
cast behavior is inherently dependent on the broadcasts in our dataset.
Our assumption is that most broadcasts are not viewbotted, and that
there are far more authentic views than inauthentic views. Over a large
number of views, we expect the bracket models will be sufficiently good
estimates of authentic behavior despite some viewbotted activity. Fur-
thermore, while individual broadcasts may have slightly different viewer
behaviors due to factors such as streamer quality, directory positioning,
etc., we expect that such differences will wash out over large numbers
of views as well. The associated bracket distributions serve to broadly
describe viewer behavior and the relative frequencies with which view-
ers start watching broadcasts of various lengths at different times and
how long they typically watch for. Using the bracket distributions, we
can answer questions such as: “how likely is a view which starts within
seconds of a short broadcast to last for the whole duration?” and “how
likely is the same phenomenon as broadcast duration increases?”
Now that we have a means for modeling both individual broadcasts
and normal broadcast behavior (in different brackets), our next task is
to discern which broadcasts are viewbotted.
4.3 Identifying Botted Broadcasts
We formulate the problem of differentiating authentic and viewbotted
broadcasts as an outlier-detection task in which our interest is to find
broadcasts that are unusually abnormal with respect to the associated
bracket model. This intuition stems from the notion that if views in
a given broadcast are distributed very differently from the views in
most other similar-length broadcasts, they are likely botted as they they
behave in an unusual and inhuman fashion. In order to accomplish our
differentiation task, we must (a) identify a way to measure deviance be-
tween the broadcast distribution bˆ and its associated bracket distribution
ˆβ(b), and (b) identify a classification threshold to set for the resulting
deviance scores.
There are a number of approaches for measuring statistical distance
between two probability distributions, including variational distance,
Hellinger distance, Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence and others. Of
these, we choose to use the KL divergence as our distance measure as
it offers nice information theoretic properties and interpretability. The
KL divergence between two distributions pˆ and qˆ is defined as
DKL(pˆ‖ qˆ)=
∑
i
(
pˆ(i)·log pˆ(i)
qˆ(i)
)
for each outcome i. The divergence is defined only if qˆ(i)=0 implies
pˆ(i)=0 in which case the summand is 0 in the limit, and is asymmetric
in the sense thatDKL(pˆ‖ qˆ) is generally not equal toDKL(qˆ‖ pˆ). The
KL divergence of qˆ from pˆ (as written above), denotes the expected
number of extra bits of information required to encode a sample from the
empirically observed pˆ distribution using a code optimized for the model
qˆ distribution rather than a code optimized for pˆ, and is thus non-negative.
It can also be interpreted as the expected log likelihood ratio between
pˆ and qˆ when pˆ is the actual distribution of observed data (see [6] for
further detail). Thus, theKL divergence of qˆ from pˆ is 0when pˆ and qˆ are
statistically indiscriminable, and large when pˆ is highly unlike qˆ. In our
usecase, we considerDKL(ˆb‖ ˆβ(b)) to be the appropriate measure of
deviance between a broadcast and its corresponding bracket distribution.
Given this means for measuring deviance, we next turn our attention
to identifying the right threshold to set for discerning viewbotted from
authentic broadcasts. While we expect that viewbotted broadcasts will
have unexpectedly high deviance from the bracket distributions, choos-
ing this threshold is important in practical implementations to limit false
positives and negatives. In doing so, we must also keep in mind that the
range of observed deviance scores will depend on the number of views
for different broadcasts. When viewcount is small, the associated distri-
bution bˆ will likely not be able to express the nuances of the associated
bracket distribution ˆβ(b) very well due to sparsity issues. Conversely,
broadcasts with high viewcount should be better at approximating the
associated bracket distribution because of sufficient numbers of samples.
Thus, we expect high variance in the deviance scores for low view-
count broadcasts, which should decline for higher viewcount broadcasts.
Figure 2 demonstrates this phenomenon – the heatmap shows a single
point for each broadcast in our dataset, reflecting the viewcount and
the corresponding deviance (KL divergence in bits) of the bracket from
the broadcast (colors indicate density as per the colorbar). Note that
most broadcasts with a certain viewcount commonly deviate from the
associated bracket distributions in a predictably shrinking range of high-
density, but several broadcasts have uncharacteristically high deviance
as depicted in the sparse cloud of points violating the expected trend.
These broadcasts with abnormally high deviance are exactly those
which we suspect are viewbotted. In order to automatically identify
these broadcasts, we compute a moving threshold of K multiples of
the inter-quartile range (IQR) above the 75th percentile (3rd quartile)
of samples as the outlier “fence“ or decision boundary. WhileK=1.5
is typically used for normally distributed data [10], we observe that
samples in each moving bin are not normally distributed – thus,K is
tuned empirically in practice. Although aKσ boundary above the mean
could also be used to similar effect, we use the 3rd quartile and IQR
here as they are less sensitive to outliers. In practice, we can also impose
a threshold U on the minimum viewcount we enforce a broadcast to
have before we even suspect it of being viewbotted in order to avoid pe-
nalizing broadcasts with abnormally high deviance due to sparsity issues
– U is tuned empirically. These broadcasts are also far less likely to be
viewbotted due to their low viewcount. Figure 1 shows a superimposed
red line indicating such an outlier fence.
Equipped with a means of discerning viewbotted from authentic
broadcasts, we next turn our attention to identifying botted views.
4.4 Identifying Botted Views
Broadcasts which have been viewbotted are likely composed of both
authentic and botted views. Distinguishing between these is a crucial
task for identifying abusive clients as well as gaining better estimates
for the amount of authentic traffic.
In order to discern between botted and authentic views, we rely on
the intuition that viewbot activity results in unusually large deviance
between the broadcast and bracket distributions, whereas authentic view-
ing behavior is more or less distributed according to (or with small
deviance from) the bracket distributions. This follows naturally from
the assumption that most viewing behavior is authentic. Thus, it stands
to reason that views which result in increased deviance between the
broadcast and bracket distributions are prime suspects for being botted.
As previously discussed in Section 4.1, marking individual views as
botted or authentic is a highly error-prone approach – as such, labeling
individual views which result in higher deviance is a risky approach.
However, again we leverage the intuition that labeling an aggregate gives
higher confidence than labeling the individual – essentially, if a similar
group of views contributes to increased deviance, we can consider the
constituent views in the group to be botted. We define a “similar” group
of views as a group whose members have temporal coherence and occur
in lockstep, or close synchrony. A number of previous works show that
lockstep behavior is a strong signal for bot activities [3, 5, 21].
Leveraging this intuition, our approach for identifying botted views is
to first identify instances of lockstep behavior (groups of similar views
in a given broadcast), and mark these instances as botted if pruning
their constituent views from the broadcast results in a smaller deviance
between the pruned/altered broadcast and the associated bracket distri-
bution. Formally, we aim to solve the following optimization problem
for each outlier broadcast b:
min
b′∈2I
DKL(bˆ′‖ ˆβ(b))
where each of the |I| instances corresponds to an exclusive subset of
views ρ(b) such that the intersection between any two instances is the
emptyset, 2I denotes the powerset of I (such that each element corre-
sponds to a subset of instances), and b′ and bˆ′ are the pruned broadcast
and resulting empirical probability distribution formed by the views in
the corresponding subset of instances. Intuitively, I gives a hard parti-
tioning of ρ(b) into |I| instances, and we are after the most seemingly
authentic combination of instances, where the objective function for
authenticity is the KL divergence between the pruned broadcast and
associated bracket distribution. This problem has multiple associated
challenges. Firstly, we must identify a means of partitioning the set of
views ρ(b) into some number of |I| instances. Secondly, as finding the
exact solution once I is fixed is still a combinatorial minimization task,
we must find an efficient and scalable means for tackling the problem.
For the first task, we can construe instances as clusters of views in
the 2D space spanned by vstart and vstay. Clustering of similar data is
a common data mining task, and we can select from a number of avail-
able clustering algorithms including hierarchical clustering, DBSCAN,
K-means and more (see [2] for an overview). Of these, K-means is com-
monly chosen due to its scalability and well-understood squared loss
criterion. However, one notable caveat of K-means is the requirement
of a user-specified number of clusters. Knowing this parameter a priori
is difficult in our usecase and many others. Thus, we instead use an
algorithm similar to X-means [20], which automatically infers a suitable
number of clusters by aiming to minimize the Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (BIC), a function of log-likelihood penalized bymodel complexity.
The approach starts with all data points in a single cluster, and iteratively
splits clusters into smaller clusters if the split reduces the BIC.While the
original X-means uses traditional K-means in the inner-loop, we instead
use a much faster minibatch variant proposed in [22] which is shown
to give only marginally worse solutions than traditional K-means. This
approach outputs a hard-partitioning of the views into a suitable number
of instances. While the clustering approach is heuristic, an intuitively
good clustering can generally be achieved over a few initializations.
The next challenge is to actually choose the subset of I which min-
imizes the above objective. As the task is to find the subset which has
a minimum divergence over all the subsets, the problem is clearly com-
binatorial and would require checking 2|I| subsets for a broadcast par-
titioned into |I| instances. As this becomes computationally expensive
quickly even for small values of |I| and given that our objective is non-
submodular, we resort to heuristics to approximate the solution. Below,
we propose several greedy heuristics for pruning the botted instances.
• PRUNE-TOPMOST – Rank each instance Ii in decreasing order
according to the resulting reduction in deviance if it is pruned
from the original broadcast b. Prune out the single instance which
results in maximal reduction. If no such instance exists, stop.
• PRUNE-ITERATIVE – Rank each instance Ii in decreasing
order according to the resulting reduction in deviance if it is
pruned from the original broadcast b. Attempt to prune each
of the instances in that order, removing those which result in
reduction from the current best. A full pass over instances is
considered 1 iteration. Repeat this iteration until convergence,
starting with the current best broadcast from the previous iteration.
If no instance is removed between the start of successive iterations,
stop.
• PRUNE-STEPWISE – Rank each instance Ii in decreasing or-
der according to the resulting reduction in deviance if it is pruned
from the original broadcast b. Prune out the single instance which
results in maximal reduction. Repeat this step until convergence,
starting with the current best broadcast from the previous step.
If no instance is removed between the start of successive steps,
stop.
Though the heuristics each offer different means of pruning bot-
ted views, they all start by considering the full set of instances I as
Algorithm 1: FLOCK
1: Model Broadcast Behavior: Aggregate per-broadcast and per-bracket views and
transform into vstart,vstay space. Build viewership models bˆ and tˆ for each
broadcast b and bracket t according to multinomial MLE parameters.
2: Identify Botted Broadcasts: Compute deviance of each broadcast’s bracket
distribution ˆβ(b) from the broadcast distribution bˆ, and generate viewcount-deviance
plot as in Figure 2. Generate decision boundary by binning viewcount logarithmically
and computing aQ3+K ·IQR fence per bin. Mark broadcasts with excessively
high deviance as botted.
3: Identify Botted Views: For each broadcast b, partition b into a set of
instances/clusters I. Attempt to solve the minimization problemDKL(bˆ′‖ ˆβ(b))
where b′ is chosen from the powerset of instances 2I . Use the most suitable heuristic
from PRUNE-TOPMOST, PRUNE-ITERATIVE and PRUNE-STEPWISE.
the initial “best” solution, and greedily removing individual instances
which result in an improvement in the objective function. Specifi-
cally, at different points in each heuristic, the test DKL(ˆbcurrent ‖
ˆβ(b))−DKL(ˆbproposed‖ ˆβ(b)) is conducted in the scenario that some
instance is removed from the current best broadcast bcurrent resulting
in the candidate broadcast bproposed, and if the result is≥0, the instance
is removed from bcurrent and the instances forming bproposed becomes
the new best solution.
PRUNE-TOPMOST involves ranking the instances only once, and
pruning the single instance which improves the objective the most. This
objective is motivated by the notion that most bot behavior might be
naive and viewbot attacks may typically only span one instance per
broadcast. PRUNE-ITERATIVE and PRUNE-STEPWISE both in-
volve pruning multiple instances if doing so improves the objective, but
vary in the extent of greediness. PRUNE-ITERATIVE ranks the set
of remaining instances at the start of each iteration based on the current
best broadcast at the start of that iteration. However, in reality, as soon
as an instance is pruned during an iteration, the true ranking for the
next best candidate instances to prune may change. It is furthermore
possible that the removal of an instance in one iteration may induce
or preclude the removal of another instance in a future iteration. The
PRUNE-ITERATIVE heuristic does not dynamically update the rank-
ing upon each successful instance pruning but rather on an iteration-level,
based on the notion that this iteration-level ranking may be sufficient
in practice. PRUNE-STEPWISE conversely does dynamically update
the ranking after each step, or successful pruning of an instance. This
way, the best candidate instance for pruning is chosen at each step at
the cost of more frequent ranking computations compared to PRUNE-
ITERATIVE if multiple instances are to be pruned. These heuristics
have various expected tradeoffs in computational efficiency and objec-
tive minimization efficacy. We examine their practical performance in
Section 5.
In conjunction with previous tasks, this gives us a means of identi-
fying both viewbotted broadcasts and their botted views. See Algorithm
1 for pseudocode of our proposed FLOCK approach.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we empirically evaluate our proposed FLOCK ap-
proach’s effectiveness in detecting viewbots. Firstly, we briefly describe
the dataset used in the evaluation. Next, we describe several experiments
in order to (a) measure success in identifying viewbotted broadcasts, (b)
evaluate comparative performance of our view pruning heuristics, (c)
demonstrate effectiveness in reliably discerning authentic from botted
views, and (d) consider implications in the presence of a well-informed
adversary. These are detailed in the below subsections.
5.1 Data Description
For the experiments below, we use data from a large, undisclosed
OriginalDKL
(avg. bits)
PrunedDKL
(avg. bits)
MAD
(bits)
MAPD
(% bits)
Runtime
(sec)
BASELINE 3.28 3.28 0 0 0
PRUNE-TOPMOST 3.28 2.87 0.408 12.26 1277.65
PRUNE-ITERATIVE 3.28 2.25 1.035 31.27 2655.51
PRUNE-STEPWISE 3.28 2.23 1.049 31.86 5119.04
Table 2: Quantitative evaluation of view pruning heuristics versus
baseline (no pruning).
livestreaming corporation spanning an 8 hour timeframe from early
May 2016. Our dataset consists of 92,044 broadcasts and an associated
16,280,308 views. For each broadcast, we have information about the
broadcasting channel and the start and end times of the broadcast. For
each view, we have information about the client IP, start and end times
and the destination channel. From these, we can associate views with
broadcasts.
5.2 Broadcast Classification
The first important consideration for evaluating effectiveness is de-
termining whether our intuition that outlier broadcasts (the sparse cloud
in Figure 2) are in fact viewbotted is correct. Unfortunately, calculating
precision is difficult given the lack of ground truth. In lieu of existing la-
bels, we resort to manual labeling. We randomly sample 100 broadcasts
each from the outlier and non-outlier regions according to the decision
boundary, intermix them, and manually label each broadcast using cri-
teria based on (a) IP/ASN entropy (whether many temporally similar
views come from a limited subset of IP prefixes or ASNs), and (b)
whether there are high-density clusters of seemingly out-of-place views.
Several such examples of suspected viewbotted broadcasts with the
associated suspected views are depicted in Figure 3. In both cases, large
fractions of broadcast views are concentrated in tightly-knit clusters
which upon further inspection were from a small number of shared IP
prefixes under a few lesser known international ASNs. Figure 3a shows
a rather simplistic type of viewbotting, in which bots join incrementally
and quickly soon after a broadcast begins, and persist until the end of
the broadcast. Conversely, Figure 3b shows a more complex type of
viewbotting in which the streamer is tuning the bot viewership over the
duration of the broadcast as he or she desires. Intuition suggests this
might occur in three cases: (a) the streamer is simply experimenting
with a viewbot provider’s tool, (b) the streamer feels they have activated
too many bots or too few bots initially, but massages the number over
time in order to try and appear legitimate, (c) malfunctions are occuring
on the viewbot provider’s side, resulting in unusual termination. Retroac-
tive analysis of the live concurrent viewers counter for this broadcast
indicates sharp/sudden spikes and drops (typically of 20 viewers at a
time) as expected given the sudden starting/stopping of various numbers
of bots indicated in the plot.
The results of our labeling experiment indicate 98% positive and
99% negative precision. That is, 98% of outlier broadcasts and 99%
of non-outlier broadcasts were labeled viewbotted and non-viewbotted
respectively. Recall numbers can unfortunately not be calculated due to
the unbounded number of false negatives. These figures suggest that our
proposed decision boundary and unsupservised classification approach
is able to make a highly accurate distinction between viewbotted and
non-viewbotted broadcasts. As in most threshold-based classification
settings, theK (IQR multiplier used for computation of the decision
boundary) can be increased to further limit false positives while catching
fewer true positives, or decreased with an inverted effect if desired.
5.3 View Pruning Heuristics
As previously discussed, the per-broadcast view pruning minimiza-
tion task proposed in Section 4.3 is combinatorial, so we propose the use
(a) 76/89 broadcast views began soon after the start and persisted for the full
duration. Note that the other 13 views are much sparser and shorter.
(b) 201/239 broadcast views are manifested in dense clusters indicating bots in
lockstep. The teal/blue instances on the diagonal contain 50 views each.
Figure 3: Viewbots creates dense clusters of activity in the (vstart, vstay) space. Two fraudulent broadcast behavior plots are shown with
suspected botted instances and their constituent views plotted in opaque color and unsuspected authentic views in translucent grey.
of several greedy heuristics with varying tradeoffs between presumed
optimization performance and scalability. In this section, we evaluate
the heuristics in these terms. PRUNE-TOPMOST costsO(H2 ·(|I|+
1)) for ranking the |I| instances and computing the KL divergence
each time, and pruning a single instance. PRUNE-ITERATIVE costs
O(H2 ·2|I|·p) for p pruning iterations where each iteration involves
ranking and trying to prune each of the |I| instances (we find p is gen-
erally very small in practice,≤5). PRUNE-STEPWISE costsO(H2 ·
(I+1)·s) for s pruning steps, each of which involves running PRUNE-
TOPMOST. Generally, PRUNE-STEPWISE is slower that PRUNE-
ITERATIVE, which is slower than PRUNE-TOPMOST. However, the
heuristics have inverse performance on the minimization task.
Table 2 gives empirical results which demonstrate these findings
in comparison to a null baseline, in which no pruning is performed.
For each heuristic, we prune each outlier broadcast in our dataset and
measure the initial average deviance (DKL, in bits) from the broadcasts
and their associated bracket distributions. We next prune each of the
broadcasts using the various heuristics and measure the post-pruning
average deviance per broadcast, mean absolute (percentage) deviation
(MAD and MAPD) and total runtime over all broadcasts (over 5 ini-
tializations). Note that here, higher is better for MAD and MAPD,
indicating a larger drop in the devianceDKL. Note that givenDKL’s
interpretation as a log likelihood ratio, an average improvement of even
1 bit corresponds to doubling agreement between distributions. While
minimization performance is inversely related to the computational
performance of the heuristics, the benefit of PRUNE-ITERATIVE
over PRUNE-TOPMOST is quite large (200%) compared to PRUNE-
STEPWISE over iterative (3%). Given the much worse scaling of
PRUNE-STEPWISE in situations where many instances are pruned,
we choose to use PRUNE-ITERATIVE in practical implementation
as it minimizes the objective almost equally well.
5.4 View Classification
As getting ground truth labels on a per-view basis is even more
difficult to obtain than on a broadcast-level, we turn to synthetic exper-
iments to evaluate FLOCK’s performance in discerning botted views
from authentic ones. To do so, we simulate botted broadcasts by varying
numbers of authentic views and botted views by sampling the two types
Figure 4: FLOCK achieves high precision/recall in discerning
synthetically botted views from authentic views.
from various distributions. Specifically, we sample authentic views from
a real bracket distribution (multinomial) and jitter them with Gaussian
noise. Subsequently, for each broadcast, we sample the first botted
view’s vstart and vstay time uniformly over the feasible space, and sub-
sequent botted view interarrival times (IAT) and intertermination times
(ITT) from a number of distributions which viewbot providers might
use to engineer real attacks. As Figure 3 indicates that botted views
are almost in lockstep and delivered over a short amount of time, we
artifically deliver and terminate these botted views in accordance over
10% of broadcast duration respectively – we refer to this attack scale
parameter as ∆. Intuitively, ∆=0.1 indicates that botted views were
delivered over a 10% timeframe, and then all terminated in a different
10% timeframe. This is a realistic setting from our observations. We
found results were not sensitive to ∆.
Figure 4 summarizes precision and recall results from experiments
on 96 combinations of the following 3 parameters: authentic viewcount
(chosen from 100, 1000 and 10000), proportion of botted views (chosen
from 0.25,0.5...2.0 – functions as a multiplier on the number of authen-
tic views), and viewbot attack distribution (IAT and ITT chosen from
uniform, Gaussian, exponential and lognormal distributions). Precision
and recall figures were averaged over 5 runs of each experiment. The re-
sults show consistently high (≥0.95) recall in almost all cases, and high
(≥ 0.9) precision for broadcasts with especially high levels of botted
activity. The precision tends to increase with higher numbers of botted
views as the clustering process is better able to separate the botted views
from authentic ones and successfully prune them. Precision also tends
to be better for broadcasts with higher number of authentic views as the
relative fraction of authentic views captured in an instance of mostly
botted views (false positive rate) is lower. These results are especially
promising for practical scenarios as in Figure 3 in which we observe
that a large fraction of total views are botted.
5.5 Adversarial Implications
In previous experiments, we operated from the assumption that botted
views are delivered in lockstep based on practical observations. But,
what are the implications of our approach in a setting with an adversary
who has complete knowledge of the bracket distributions he must emu-
late to appear normal? Note that this is a very strict setting – in order to
have the correct bracket distribution to sample from, the adversary must
a priori know (a) broadcast duration (b) internal records on viewerbase
behavior. As such, we do not expect this level of sophistication from
an attacker, but it is a useful thought experiment.
We conduct an experiment in which the adversary acts to minimize
risk of being caught by sampling directly from the target bracket distribu-
tion (provably optimal, as deviance between broadcast and bracket is 0 in
the limit). Since adversaries are IP constrained, we aim to evaluate the IP
cost implications upon adopting this strategy. Specifically, we calculate
how many more IPs are required to reach the same average concurrent
viewer count for FLOCK with a rate limit compared to a standalone
rate limit. We estimate this figure by computing the expected value of
a random variable with outcomes corresponding to the relative over-
head in maximum concurrent viewers required under both regimes per
bracket and probability corresponding to the empirical bracket frequency.
Our results indicate that using FLOCK with a rate limit incurs a 40%
overhead in IP addresses required to viewbot compared to naive rate lim-
iting – intuitively, viewbot providers need 40% more IPs to add “noise”
resembling real views rather than simply activating bots in lockstep
like in Figure 3. Thus, we conclude that even against a knowledgeable
adversary, our approach significantly increases the cost of viewbotting.
5.6 Scalability
FLOCK’s analysis phase begins by clustering each of the outlier
broadcasts in Bbotted. As X-means has been shown to scale better than
Figure 5: FLOCK scales linearly in the number of views.
traditional K-means, we consider the time complexity for clustering
the views of each broadcast b to be at worst O(|ρ(b)| · |I| ·d ·c), for
|ρ(b)| views, |I| instances, d dimensions (2 in our case) and c clustering
iterations. Upon clustering, we use PRUNE-ITERATIVE to prune
suspected botted instances and views from each broadcast – see Section
5.3 for complexity analysis of the heuristics. Figure 5 shows the linear
scaling of FLOCK on a number of synthetically generated broadcasts
with varying viewcount.
6. DISCUSSION
FLOCK is an unsupervised, offline (post hoc) approach for detecting
botted broadcasts and views in livestreaming. In practice, the results can
be leveraged in a number of ways. Firstly, FLOCK can be used daily
on newly collected view and broadcast data. The results of these daily
runs can provide history of a streamer’s broadcasts as well as history
of each seen IP’s previous views along with FLOCK’s associated ruling
of (in)authenticity. The former can be used to aid in making partern-
ship decisions by filtering fraudulent applicants with a history of botted
broadcasts. The latter can be used to better estimate true past viewership,
and adjust future live viewcounts using IP-based penalties reflecting
the prevalence of previously botted activity from the IP. It can also be
used to identify viewbot browser, service provider and environment
signatures decipherable from the received HTTP requests and proxy
ground “truth” for a supervised scheme.
While not the focus of this work, FLOCK could be used in other
contexts such as detecting fake ad clicks and video views where ground
truth is difficult to obtain. While the feature space may be different, a
similar approach of finding lockstep instances which violate “normality”
assumptions appears promising.
7. CONCLUSION
Online livestreaming has become a prevalent means for individuals to
broadcast creative content to the masses. Streamers have high incentive
to gain viewership in order to promote their brand, gain status and earn
a living through ad revenue, donations and subscriptions. In this work,
we are the first to focus on the problem of astroturfed, or artificially
inflated viewership on livestreaming platforms. We begin by character-
izing the livestreaming context and formalizing the problem setting for
identifying fake views. To this end, we propose FLOCK, a principled
and scalable method for identifying botted broadcasts and views in an
unsupervised fashion. FLOCK works by first discerning broadcasts with
highly abnormal and seemingly inhuman viewership behavior, and next
tries to prune out lockstep views from these broadcasts which make
the broadcast appear more genuine. Our approach achieves over 98%
precision in identifying botted broadcasts and over 90% precision/recall
in identifying views in large viewbot attacks.
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